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The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of several
new and old respiratory tract infectious diseases, which threaten
global health security due to their epidemic potential.1,2 These
include multi-drug resistant TB, Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome (SARS), avian and swine inﬂuenza and more recently the
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). MERS is a new zoonotic
disease of humans caused by a coronavirus (MERS-CoV) which was
ﬁrst isolated in September, 2012 from a patient who died from a
severe respiratory disease in Jeddah Saudi Arabia.3 Since then
MERS has attracted global media attention because it is associated
with a high mortality (44%) in individuals who have co-morbidities
such as diabetes, chronic renal, liver or lung illnesses or in those
who are immunocompromised.4,5
The recent unprecedented outbreak of the MERS6,7 in South
Korea which arose consequential to the importation of MERS-CoV by
a South Korean traveler to the Middle East, alarmed global public
health authorities and highlights the potential of MERS-CoV to
spread across the globe and cause local outbreaks. The WHO Director
general convened the ninth meeting of the Emergency Committee
(EC) under the International Health Regulations regarding MERS-
CoV on 16 June 2015 to discuss the Korean outbreak.8 As of 23rd June
the total number of MERS cases reported from the Republic of South
Korea now stands at 175 (94 currently receiving treatment,
54 recovered, 27 deaths.6,8 Of 175 cases, 80 patients and 33 hospital
staff had contracted the virus nosocomially, 62 friends, colleagues
and relatives had come in contact within healthcare facilities while
visiting family members with MERS.
2. Global distribution of MERS cases
Virological and serological studies from several Middle Eastern,
West and East African countries indicate that bats and dromedary
camels are likely reservoirs of MERS-CoV.9–12 However, human
MERS-CoV infections appear to be endemic only to countries in the
Middle East where sporadic cases continue to occur in the
community throughout the year.13 From currently available data
it appears that MERS-CoV does not transmit easily from person to
person and to date no sustained community transmission has been
documented. As of 22nd June 2015, 1038 cases of MERS-CoV
infection with 459 deaths (44% mortality) have been notiﬁed to the
World Health Organization,13 a large majority of MERS cases have
been reported from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
MERS cases have also been detected in Algeria, Austria, China, Egypt,
France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia,http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2015.06.020
1201-9712/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Netherlands, Philippines, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Tunesia, Turkey,
Yemen, United Kingdom, and United States of America. All MERS
cases reported from the USA, European and Asian countries had a
history of travel to the Middle East. MERS cases continue to be
reported from the Middle East with on going MERS outbreak in
Hufoof, Saudi Arabia.13 The outbreak in Seoul, Republic of Korea, has
been linked to a single individual who had travelled to Saudi Arabia.
The ﬁrst MERS case in Thailand was reported last week and the
patient had a history of travel from the Sultanate of Oman.13
3. MERS and sub-Saharan Africa
Of note is the striking absence of any MERS cases (primary or
travel related) reported from sub-Saharan African (SSA) coun-
tries.14,15 The reasons MERS-CoV predominantly affects humans in
the Middle East and is not endemic in Africa where MERS-CoV-
infected camels and bats are present requires further study. A likely
explanation may be that this may simply reﬂect the lack of clinical
awareness of exposure risk, diagnosis and treatment of respiratory
tract infections largely remains clinically based and empiric in most
SSA countries coupled with absence of surveillance.14
Every year an estimated 10 million pilgrims from over
182 countries travel to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to participate
in Hajj pilgrimage, the mini-pilgrimage Umrah (which is performed
at any time of the year), or for the month of Ramadaan.16Of these, an
estimated 1 million pilgrims come from sub-Saharan African
countries. There were no cases of MERS reported during the 2012,
2013 and 2014 Hajj pilgrimages or the Ramadaan period.17–19
However, the risk of MERS-CoV spreading globally remains due to
the continuous inﬂux of pilgrims and the persistent low levels of
endemic MERS-CoV transmission to humans in Saudi Arabia. There
is also the possibility that MERS-CoV may mutate into a form more
adaptable for human to human transmission over time.
The potential risk of MERS-CoV infection to pilgrims who
visit Saudi Arabia from different regions of the world was
estimated by Coker and colleagues20 based on overall incidence
of MERS cases in Saudi Arabia since its ﬁrst discovery in
2012. Their estimates based on the most likely scenario using
recent pilgrim numbers for sub-Saharan Africa are that there
will be at most ten returning pilgrims each year with MERS-CoV
infections. National surveillance systems should be on alert for
the low but long-lasting risk of MERS-CoV infected pilgrims
returning from the Umrah throughout the year, and also for the
large numbers of refugees at several conﬂict zones in the Middle
East (those migrating from Syria to Turkey and from the Yemen
border into Saudi Arabia and beyond).ciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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The recent MERS outbreak in the Republic of Korea was
associated with secondary, tertiary, quarternary and quinary cases
of MERS-CoV transmission, though fortunately there has been no
sustained community transmission.6,8 The Republic of Korea MERS-
CoV outbreak has many similarities with that of previously reported
MERS-CoV outbreaks which occurred at healthcare facilities in
several cities in Saudi Arabia and from Jordan21–24 which were all
associated with breaches and gaps in infection prevention and
control protocols.
These lapses in Korean hospitals enabled MERS-CoV infected
and uninfected patients, staff and visitors to mix freely in busy and
crowded accident and emergency departments, within wards and
multi-bed hospital rooms, with no isolation or quarantine of
suspected cases. Public health measures such as enhanced contact
tracing and isolation and quarantine put in place by the Korean
government to control the outbreak eventually led to the decline in
the numbers of MERS cases and the outbreak is being brought
under control. The importance of infection controls measures was
also illustrated by the Saudi Arabian hospital MERS outbreaks,
where well-trained health care and workforce brought the hospital
outbreaks under control quickly.21,22
The WHO EC meeting noted that8 ‘‘. . . the outbreak was strongly
associated with healthcare settings and that the main factors
contributing to the spread of MERS-CoV in the Republic of Korea
were:
a) Lack of awareness among health care workers and the general
public about MERS;
b) Suboptimal infection prevention and control measures in
hospitals;
c) Close and prolonged contact of infected MERS patients in
crowded emergency rooms and multibed rooms in hospitals;
d) The practice of seeking care at multiple hospitals (‘‘doctor
shopping’’);
e) The custom of many visitors or family members staying with
infected patients in the hospital rooms facilitating secondary
spread of infections among contacts.’’
The WHO EC8 referred to the outbreak as a ‘wake-up’ call and
state that in a highly mobile world, all countries should always be
prepared for the unanticipated possibility of outbreaks of MERS-
CoV and other serious infectious diseases.
The Korean MERS outbreak is the largest recorded from outside
the Middle East and the largest imported from a returning traveller
to the Middle East, raising several important issues for global
surveillance and control. It illustrates that MERS-CoV, three years
after its ﬁrst discovery remains an important global public health
risk with many unanswered questions.25 Further international
spread should be anticipated and countries with weaker health
systems and lack of laboratory facilities to accurately screen for
MERS-CoV need to be vigilant. This will pose major challenges.25
There are important lessons here for sub-Saharan African and other
developing countries from where MERS-CoV cases have not yet
been detected.
5. MERS-CoV surveillance in sub-Saharan Africa
As the recent Ebola Virus Disease epidemic illustrates, African
countries may be very vulnerable to a Korea-like MERS-CoV
outbreak, which may arise from returning pilgrims or other
travellers from Saudi Arabia26 or from traders between Saudi
Arabia and the Horn of Africa. MERS-CoV is transmitted through
MERS-CoV-infected respiratory secretions for which contact and
droplet precautions are recommended.27–30The Korean MERS outbreak highlights that hospitals provide
ideal conditions for amplifying MERS-CoV transmission arising
from close contact between patients, healthcare and ancillary staff,
relatives and other visitors, which enables spread of MERS-CoV.6,8
It is critical that every country should maintain a high level of
vigilance and perform MERS-CoV surveillance according to widely
available expert recommendations,27–30 whether or not MERS
cases have been detected in their countries, it ensuring infection
prevention and control protocols are in place at all health-care
facilities. Those who travel must be educated to follow basic
hygiene measures30 and those develop ill health during their trip to
the Middle East, or soon after their return should seek medical care
and volunteer the history of travel to their healthcare provider.
Sub-Saharan African governments must pay serious attention
to strengthening infection control and public health surveillance
systems. All healthcare workers and travellers from Africa to the
Middle East should be aware of the threat to global health security
posed by MERS-CoV. Considering a diagnosis of MERS at ﬁrst
presentation may be difﬁcult due to non-speciﬁc symptoms at
clinical presentation. However it is important that prevention and
control measures are instituted at ﬁrst consideration of MERS as a
diagnosis to prevent spread of MERS-CoV. Hospitals and clinics
providing care for patients infected with suspected or conﬁrmed
MERS-CoV infection should take appropriate measures to decrease
the risk of MERS-CoV transmission from the infected patient to
other patients, doctors, nurses, allied health-care workers,
relatives and visitors. Health-care workers should be educated
and trained in infection prevention and control and should have
continuing professional development on these issues.
Over the past decade, several surveillance systems have been
introduced to monitor the emergence of new infectious patho-
gens.31 As the Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa showed,
surveillance systems in African countries for infectious diseases
with epidemic potential require strengthening. More effective
national, regional, and international surveillance systems are
required to enable rapid identiﬁcation of emerging respiratory
epidemics, diseases with epidemic potential, their speciﬁc microbial
cause, origin, mode of acquisition, and transmission dynamics.
In light of the Republic of Korea MERS outbreak increased
vigilance and surveillance for MERS-CoV should be carried out by
health services in African countries using current clinical and public
health guidelines for MERS-CoV.28 Although resources may not
allow for making an accurate diagnosis of MERS, a high degree of
awareness of the possibility of MERS-CoV infection in all returning
pilgrims will allow early, isolation of patients and putting in place
infection control measures, avoiding a repeat of the Korea outbreak.
Sub-Saharan African countries need to protect themselves
against the possible outbreaks akin to the Korean one. MERS-CoV
should be included in list of pathogens by The African Network of
Inﬂuenza Surveillance and Epidemiology (ANISE)32 and MERS-CoV
should be made part of the Strengthening Inﬂuenza Sentinel
Surveillance in Africa (SISA)’ with national, regional and interna-
tional reporting mechanisms33 in liaison with other stakeholders
involved in global infectious diseases surveillance. New, low cost,
rapid, sensitive and speciﬁc diagnostic tests that can be used at all
points of healthcare are require for all infectious diseases which
threaten global health security.34 The exact mode of transmission
and pathogenesis of MERS-CoV and other novel respiratory tract
viruses such as H7N9 inﬂuenza A virus require deﬁnition so that
more effective prevention and management measures can be
developed and introduced.35 A united and coordinated global
response is needed to tackle emerging respiratory tract infections
and to ﬁll major gaps25 in the understanding of the epidemiology,
transmission dynamics, pathogenesis prevention and control of
these infectious diseases.
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